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ESSAY IN LAW
“Reaganomics” and Antitrust Enforcement: A 
Jurisprudential Critique
John J. Flynn*
There are few judges, psychoanalysts or economists today who do 
not begin a consideration of their typical problems with some 
formula designed to cause all moral problems to disappear and to 
produce an issue purified for the procedure of positive empirical 
science. But the ideals have generally retired to hats from which 
later wonders will magically arise.**
I. I n t r o d u c t io n
One cannot fully comprehend the current enforcement stance 
of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission 
without some introductory comments about the underlying philos­
ophies of Assistant Attorney General Baxter and Chairman Miller. 
Both are strong proponents and devoted followers of the so-called 
“Chicago school of economics.” This relatively recent school of 
thought emphasizes one form of economic analysis, the neoclassical 
approach, and advocates that this approach be made the exclusive 
premise of antitrust enforcement.1 It is a school of thought whose 
basic assumptions are under substantial attack and whose method­
ology for analyzing the facts of real cases is open to serious ques­
tion. To paraphrase the late Fred Rodell, there are only two things 
wrong with the Chicago school’s philosophy: one is form, the other
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1. In the academic world, the leading proponents of the Chicago school’s analysis of 
antitrust issues have been Professor Posner, now a judge on the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Professor Bork, now a judge on the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia, Professor Baxter, now Assistant Attorney General of 
the Antitrust Division and apparently Mr. Miller, now Chairman of the Federal Trade 
Commission.,
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is substance.2
I will not rehearse all the elements of that school of thought 
here, nor the considerable debate and discussion which it has pro­
voked in academic circles.3 Its major implication for antitrust is 
that it would limit antitrust intervention in the market to actions 
aimed at removing private arrangements restricting out­
put—“output” as defined by the Chicago school’s economic model. 
All other structure and conduct would be presumed to be efficient 
or subject to the self-correcting forces of competition. The discus­
sion and the debate provoked by this theory have usefully chal­
lenged old assumptions and called attention to the potential costs 
of government intervention in the market. Where translated into 
enforcement policy, however, the philosophy generally has been a 
disaster for the effective and fair administration of the antitrust 
laws. I say disaster because the artificial and abstract conclusions 
of the theoretical academic debate have been translated into en­
forcement policy without regard for the serious and devastating 
questions raised about the Chicago school’s approach to antitrust 
enforcement and its impact on the purposes of law. Furthermore, 
this enforcement policy has been implemented without the ap­
proval of Congress and, in many instances, without the approval of 
the courts. Similarly, the new philosophy (I prefer to call it a theol­
ogy) has been implemented without much regard for reality, the 
broader goals of the law and the methodology and function of the 
legal process.
II. C u rren t P o licy
A. Schools of Thought
The Reagan Administration’s economic philosophy includes 
three complementary dogmas. One dogma is the belief that all of 
our inflationary problems can be cured simply by controlling the 
money supply. This is the “monetarist” theology, whose followers 
are fond of attacking whatever the Federal Reserve Board does as
2. R odell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 V a. L . R ev. 38, 38 (1937).
3. See A. L owe, A n  E conomic K nowledge: T oward a  S cience of P olitical E co­
nomics (2d ed. 1983); The Goals of Antitrust: A Dialogue on Policy, 65 Colum. L . R ev. 363 
(1965); Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 H ofstra L . R ev. 485 (1980); Anti­
trust Law and Economics, 127 U. P a. L . R ev. 918 (1979); Antitrust Jurisprudence: A Sym­
posium on the Economic, Political, and Social Goals of Antitrust Policy, 125 U. P a. L . R ev. 
1182 (1977).
HeinOnline -- 1983 Utah L. Rev. 270 1983
No. 2] ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 271
never being the right response, at the right time or with the right 
intensity. A second dogma is that simply by cutting taxes, without 
regard to other factors influencing the economy, we can achieve 
Nirvana because the increase of the supply of discretionary income 
to the consumer will fuel a massive recovery of the economy. This 
is the “ supply-side” theology, whose proponents are fond of draw­
ing curves on napkins. The third dogma, supported by the Anti­
trust Division’s leadership and the Chairman of the Federal Trade 
Commission, asserts that a variant of the neoclassical economic 
model should be rigorously followed in antitrust enforcement to 
the exclusion of all other considerations.
These three theories represent the theology of the Chicago 
school, whose priesthood is fond of drawing supply and demand 
curves and coining slogans such as “consumer welfare” and “eco­
nomic efficiency.” According to the Chicago school, we should pre­
tend that the economy is governed by consumers equal in all re­
spects, that consumers behave rationally in all circumstances, that 
power and wealth distribution are equal, that large institutions ei­
ther do not exist or behave like individuals and that the task of the 
law is to rid rational economic man of government interference in 
the free competitive economy. It follows from this series of as­
sumptions that the bounty of the private economy will be maxi­
mized for the benefit of us all.
These three simplistic policies have common elements. Each is 
rigidly applied, each is put forth as the path of truth and each 
claims that other considerations are irrelevant. The monetarists 
seek to choke what they see as the main taproot of inflation by 
restricting the output of money into the economy. The supply- 
siders seek to restrict the income of government and the output of 
government services on the theory that the government is the 
source of all evil, and that private waste and economic power are 
irrelevant. The neoclassical antitrust position seeks to restrict the 
influence of government as a counterweight to private aggregations 
of power in the economy. Neoclassicists see government interven­
tion in the market system which is designed to rectify market mal­
functions, anticompetitive structure or behavior that distorts the 
competitive process, as an evil or as counterproductive unless it is 
aimed at clearly proven restrictions of output. Private intervention 
in the market is otherwise presumed to be “efficient” or as promot­
ing “ consumer welfare” because the economic model employed by 
the neoclassicists has a built-in series of assumptions and con­
straints which admit of no other hypothesis.
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These policies have been implemented for the past three years 
by the Reagan Administration through its monetary, fiscal and an­
titrust policies. In monetary affairs, the Administration consist­
ently has fostered a very rigid policy of tight money. In fiscal af­
fairs, the supply-siders have been carrying the day by securing 
massive tax cuts with little concern for deficits, high interest rates, 
unemployment and lagging demand. In monetary and fiscal affairs, 
however, recent reversals of policy have occurred because the the­
ology of the monetarists and the supply-siders collided with real­
ity. That reality suggested that we were rapidly advancing into a 
depression as the result of high interest rates and bulging deficits. 
Reality also indicated that simplistic solutions vigorously followed 
to the exclusion of other relevant considerations simply did not 
work and were often counterproductive.
The Federal Reserve Board’s experience with relaxing the pol­
icy of tight money exemplifies such a reversal of policy. Faced with 
ballooning defense and entitlement expenditures, Congress and the 
President executed a “midcourse correction” as well and altered 
the fanaticism with which supply-side economics was applied by 
enacting modest tax increases. Thus, while the Chicago school’s 
theology may have some grains of truth in its view of the solution 
to our economic problems, the insistence that its theology be fol­
lowed rigorously and excessively to the exclusion of all other in­
sights has helped lead us to a disastrous economic situation that 
the Administration’s “midcourse corrections” now are trying to al­
leviate. For the ten million unemployed and the victims of exces­
sively high real interest rates, however, the pain still persists.
Unfortunately, a similar course reversal has not followed with 
regard to the dogma being applied in the area of antitrust. Instead, 
the leaders of the enforcement agencies have bluntly stated that 
they intend to apply the Chicago school theology of 
microeconomics to all aspects of antitrust enforcement/ They ap­
parently intend to do so despite the broader purposes of Congress 
in adopting the antitrust statutes, despite adverse consequences 
for the competitive process and despite the well-established and 
judicially supported precedent to the contrary. Furthermore, the 
antitrust enforcement agencies continue to apply their philosophy 
despite mounting criticism of the assumptions of their theology, 
the values that theology represents, the methodology by which it is 
implemented and the consequences for our long term economic
4. Washington Post, Aug. 13, 1982, at A l, col. 1.
HeinOnline -- 1983 Utah L. Rev. 272 1983
No. 2] ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 273
vitality.
B. Criticisms of the Neoclassical Approach
Not only are the assumptions and value judgments of neoclas­
sical antitrust theory under serious attack by several commenta­
tors8 and inconsistent with the values Congress intended to imple­
ment when it adopted the antitrust laws, its methodology also is 
suspect.® The Baxter-Miller approach to antitrust issues, an ap­
proach based on views honestly held, brilliantly articulated and 
rigorously applied, fully embraces the abstract theoretical specula­
tion of the neoclassical school. Mr. Baxter’s views are the
result of the current intellectual imperialism of high-powered econo­
mists who (1) believe that economics can be used to uncover nearly 
all knowledge worth having about our social and political institu­
tions; and (2) profess that there is little worth knowing about those 
institutions that cannot be expressed in quantitative terms. In this 
imperialist war, economics is their strategy and regression their pre­
ferred weapon.7
The rigid use of deductive logic, while employing the “ intellectual 
imperialism” associated with this form of economic analysis, pro­
duces the arrogance of true believers—an arrogance that is intoler­
ant of the views of others, disdainful of historical insights and ob­
livious to the broader function of law to implement the moral 
values of society. Its claims to be a “science” are beyond belief, 
and the belief that its methodology produces truth and the “cor­
rect” result in formulating antitrust policy should be ranked with 
similar claims made for ouija boards and astrology.
Mature science recognizes its models as working hypotheses 
limited by the assumptions underlying the model and by the un­
varnished consequences of applying the model to brute reality. The 
hypothesis is only a starting point to aid in our understanding of 
reality. It is always subject to rejection where the assumptions and 
reality do not equate, and it should never be held up as a “totem,” 
immutable and free of change.8 These limitations upon “scientific”
5. See authorities cited supra note 3.
6. See Brodley, Limiting Conglomerate Mergers: The Need for Legislation, 40 Ohio 
St. L.J. 867 (1979); Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 Cornell 
L. R ev. 1140 (1982); Schwartz, On The Uses of Economics: A Review of the Antitrust Trea­
tises, 128 U. P a . L. R ev. 244 (1979); Sullivan, Antitrust, Microeconomics, and Politics: Re­
flections on Some Recent Relationships, 68 Calif. L. R ev. 1 (1980).
7. R.O. T ollison, T he P olitical E conomy of A ntitrust 71 (1980).
8. See J. Conant, M odern S cience and M odern M an (1952); T . K uhn, T he Struc­
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reasoning are widely accepted in the physical sciences, where there 
may be some justification for believing that there are fixed, ulti­
mate, and-universal rules governing the behavior of matter and ce­
lestial bodies. In economics, however, we have yet to discover simi­
lar rules, if, in fact, they do exist. Indeed, the involvement of 
unpredictable human behavior in matters economic makes reason­
able the assumption that immutable rules are both unlikely and 
undesirable. I am confident that many scientists would be startled 
to learn that some economists claim their discipline to be a “sci­
ence” that has discovered fixed and immutable rules capable of 
governing and quantifying the human and institutional actions 
that dictate what society’s law should and must be. The fact that 
their model is constructed out of thin air with no reference to such 
other sources of human knowledge as psychology, history, sociology 
and law, seems not to matter to the true believers. It does, how­
ever, serve to demonstrate the fact that this form of economic 
analysis is not a “science,” but instead is a religion premised upon 
a well-hidden series of value choices and ideological preferences 
that are seldom discussed and which dictate how our economic af­
fairs ought to be ordered. Joan Robinson described the conse­
quences of this state of affairs in the “science” of economics as 
follows:
Mathematical operations are performed upon entities that cannot be 
defined; calculations are made in terms of units that cannot be mea­
sured; accounting identities are mistaken for functional relation­
ships; correlations are mistaken for causal laws; differences are iden­
tified with changes; and one-way movements in time are treated like 
movements to and fro in space. The complexity of models is elabo­
rated merely for display, far and away beyond the possibility of ap­
plication to reality.®
This religion’s refusal to reexamine its fixed assumptions in 
light of other sources of wisdom, competing value choices and 
evolving reality is accompanied by an exclusive preoccupation with 
extensive manipulation of the fixed elements of its models. This, in 
turn, creates an even more elaborate structure of complex rules 
and jargon, which attempts to adjust reality to the dictates of the 
underlying dogma. Such an approach cuts off constructive dialogue
ture of S cientific R evolutions (2d ed. 1970); A. W hitehead, T he F unction of R eason 
(1957).
9. V. W alsh  & H . G ram , Classical and N eo-Classical T heories of E quilibrium xi 
(1979).
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and thwarts the struggle we all face to understand reality and ad­
vance the common good. It is startling to read the works of econo­
mists discussing human motivation which fail to mention Freud or 
Jung, or which postulate simplistic theories about the behavior of 
modern business firms without mentioning C. Wright Mills or 
modern organizational theory. The cloister mentality of some 
forms of modern economic theory reminds one of medieval medical 
practitioners, content to eliminate the vapors by bleeding the pa­
tient until there was no blood left, whereupon the deity—or in our 
case, the market—would bear responsibility for the unfortunate re­
sults. Such a “scientific” system deceptively sidetracks the debate 
of what public policy ought to be into a rigid, closed and static 
system of analysis where the conclusions are as predetermined as 
the peculiar assumptions of fact and the narrow specification of 
certain values. Professor Mason has spelled out the roots of that 
deception as follows:
“Deception occurs because the pure theories of this [individual­
istic neoclassical] framework are consistently misapplied in the in­
terpretation of concrete reality” . . . .  Accordingly, so-called empiri­
cists have sought to verify their own hypotheses and to demolish 
contrary views by selection and manipulation of data that cannot 
accomplish either purpose. Such performances have been character­
ized as “blatantly ascientific” . . . and “an abandonment of empiri­
cal science for a numerology similar to astfology” . . . .
Economic theory has developed from exchanges in the free mar­
ket for ideas. Ironically, too many of the neoclassical defenders, of 
which monetarists comprise the dominant sect, attempt to restrict 
this market by making pronouncements based on unrealistic as­
sumptions, then asserting the irrelevance of the irrelevance of the 
assumptions. Granting the validity of such methodology would ter­
minate the dialogue on economics and convert the “science” into a 
babel of competing dogmas of self-appointed prophets.10
One of the underlying assumptions of the neoclassical ap­
proach to antitrust enforcement is that proponents of government 
intervention in private economic affairs bear a heavy burden to 
demonstrate that government intervention will provide positive 
benefits—“positive benefits” as defined by the neoclassicists’ 
model. This underlying assumption is based on the ideological 
premises of Professor Coase.11 Coase postulated that the govern­
10. See Mason, Some Negative Thoughts on Friedman’s Positive Economics, 3 J. 
P ost-K eynesian E con. 235 (1980).
11. Coase, The Problems of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960).
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ment operates imperfectly.12 Thus, Coase believed that in deter­
mining whether governmental intervention in the economic system 
is appropriate, it is never sufficient to demonstrate that, without 
intervention, the market would operate imperfectly. Because gov­
ernment also operates imperfectly, Coase asserted that it also is 
necessary to compare the actual workings of the market and gov­
ernment in the particular setting and require proof that govern­
ment intervention would be better than leaving the market to its 
own devices.13 Thus, Coase shifted the burden of proof in such a 
way that it is not enough to show that certain practices injure the 
common good; one also must show that government intervention 
will do better than an abstraction—“the market.” Why this is so 
and how it can be proved are not explained. Coase put forward no 
evidence or hard data to support his ideological assumptions be­
cause there is none. They are political beliefs, not “ scientific 
truths.” But Coase’s view of governmental intervention has become 
a fundamental premise of the neoclassicist’s economic analysis of 
antitrust legal issues.
The proponents of a neoclassical economic analysis of anti­
trust issues make several fundamental factual assumptions as well 
in constructing their models: First, they assume that there are nu­
merous sellers who sell homogeneous goods to numerous and un- 
differentiable buyers.14 Second, they assume that those sellers and 
buyers possess complete information about goods, prices, supply 
and demand.15 Third, they believe that market entry is costless for 
both sellers and buyers.16 Lastly, they assume that there are no 
separate or external costs to seller and buyer transactions.17 Im­
plicit in these assumptions is the belief that the parties have the 
capacity to engage in exchange and the power to do so on equal 
terms.18
Thus, this market theory “postulates that exchange will occur
12. Id. a t 17.
13. Id. a t 17-19.





This implicit assumption is limited, however, by the assumption of numerous sellers 
and buyers which dictates the existence of a distribution of goods and money and 
requires that all sellers and buyers operate within wealth or budget constraints, and 
further, by the assumption that individual transactions are very small in relation to 
the total volume of transactions.
HeinOnline -- 1983 Utah L. Rev. 276 1983
No. 2] ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 277
and continue so long as each transaction is mutually advantageous 
to the parties to the transaction.”19 When further exchanges will 
serve only to benefit one party while disadvantaging the other, no 
further exchanges will occur and economic equilibrium will have 
been reached. When equilibrium is reached, “efficiency” suppos­
edly is achieved through “an efficient or value-maximizing alloca­
tion of resources . . .  by mutually advantageous exchange.”20 
Professor Sullivan has succinctly summarized where these as­
sumptions lead one in fashioning specific antitrust rules:
This approach . . . uses two static, structural models, the competi­
tive market and the monopolized market. From the assumptions of 
neoclassical economics it establishes theoretically that when an in­
dustry is monopolized, there will be less investment, lower output 
and higher prices than if, other things being equal, the industry 
were competitive. Chicago analysis asserts that where monopoly ex­
ists resource allocations will be inefficient in the sense that total 
consumer satisfaction, as measured by market prices, will be less 
than if the market were competitive.21
According to Sullivan, the Chicago school attributes all non­
competitive performance to cartels or monopolies.22 The noncom­
petitive behavior is viewed as inherently short-lived as “the con­
stant threat of entry and the constant discipline of inter-industry 
competition reduce both the probability of monopoly and the lon­
gevity of cartelization.”23 Recall that under the Chicago school’s 
approach, few entry barriers are deemed to exist, and most vertical 
restraints are viewed as “efficiency producing.”24 Furthermore, be­
cause Chicago school theory recognizes few economic activities as
19. Id.
20. Id. at 32-33.
21. Sullivan, Economics and More Humanistic Disciplines: What Are The Sources 
of Wisdom for Antitrust?, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1214, 1214-16 (1977).
22. Id. at 1214.
23. Id. at 1214-15.
24. Id. at 1215:
[Chicago school theory] deals with vertical restraint through monopoly and cartel 
theory. Restraints that threaten foreclosure, such as tying, tend to be deemed expres­
sions of the urge to discriminate and, though signifying some degree of horizontal 
power, are viewed as having no greater operational significance than other modes of 
discrimination. Resale restraints are viewed as harmful only if imposed at the in­
stance of dealers utilizing the manufacturer to implement their own cartel. If such 
restraints are imposed by the manufacturer they are regarded as incapable of raising 
prices above a competitive level because of competition from substitute products and 
adjacent industries, and the threat of new entry. Since the manufacturer is assumed, 
theoretically, to be acting in its own self interest and subject to the discipline of the 
market, it is inferred that these restraints are efficiency producing.
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socially harmful, government intervention in the form of antitrust 
enforcement can be kept to a minimum.25 Needless to say, “Chi­
cago theory makes for an attractively tidy antitrust world,” requir­
ing little of the antitrust “policeman,” save keeping a sharp eye out 
for cartels and those violations the closed model defines as “so­
cially harmful.”26
The highly abstract and artificial assumptions underlying the 
neoclassical model do not equate with reality. Instead, they are a 
series of factual hypotheses premised on well hidden ideological 
value choices. The hypotheses give rise to several further static 
rules and subrules with which neoclassical economists then test ex­
perience and reality without reference to time, power, wealth dis­
tribution, imperfections in the market place and the dynamic na­
ture of complex relationships. For example, the neoclassicist’s 
assumption, borrowed from an earlier time, that man is the ra­
tional maximizer of his ends in life is an assumption blithely trans­
ferred to institutions Adam Smith never dreamed of, such as the 
large corporation, unions and the other complex institutions of 
modern post-industrial society. It also is a concept applied to 
wage-earning individuals living in a society with few frontiers. Fur­
thermore, that society is inundated by advertising and is subject to 
mounting collectivism and homogenization by mass communica­
tion. Most of the individuals living in this society are dependent on 
their status with a large institution for their economic well-being 
and long term security. They are not the yeoman farmers or indi­
vidual entrepreneurs of Adam Smith’s time.
In addition to such gross generalizations about consumer and 
institutional behavior, neoclassical thought makes several other as­
sumptions. It assumes that all demand curves slope downwards, 
that all producers are rational profit maximizers, that all consum­
ers have the necessary information to make rational choices, that 
there are many sellers of equal strength in the market and none 
has power, that the distribution of wealth is irrelevant and that 
consumers are sovereign and have all power in the market. No em­
pirical evidence, however, supports these claims and common expe­
rience refutes most of them.
25. See id. It is necessary, however, to look out for cartels, for although cartels gener­
ally are short-lived, they may be harmful before their demise. Thus, there is some socially 
efficient level of investment in antitrust enforcement. Congress simply must work out an 
efficient matrix of deterrents, and enforcement agencies must direct their activities solely 
toward those violations that Chicago school theory identifies as socially harmful. Id.
26. Id.
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Advocates of a neoclassical analysis of legal issues argue that 
the legal system should follow the judgments of their abstract 
model of the market. They construct that market on a series of 
unreal assumptions inconsistent with the assumptions engaged in 
by Adam Smith when he formulated his basic free market theories. 
Smith and the other great thinkers of the western economic tradi­
tion assumed that the choices of rational maximizers would be con­
trolled and directed by the moral views of the society as expressed 
through society’s laws and other institutions.87 Law serves as the 
means by which society sorts out the conflicting claims of rational 
maximizers. It prohibits some choices because they are inconsis­
tent with the moral, social or political values of society. Other 
choices are regulated because of their impact on the culturally or 
legally defined claims of other individuals. Still other choices are 
not regulated because a moral evaluation of the circumstances in­
dicates that choice “ought” not be regulated—at least not regu­
lated by law. Legislative and judicial bodies are engaged primarily 
in making these moral choices when they adopt and interpret laws 
such as the antitrust laws. They are not engaged in the enshrine­
ment of abstract theoretical models premised on unreal factual as­
sumptions that are mechanistically applied without regard to ei­
ther the moral purposes of the law or the practical consequences of 
the law’s application to the real affairs of the world. Were this the 
case, and law’s function was made subservient to the dictates of an 
abstraction, law would no longer serve as the pragmatic bridge be­
tween principle and reality.
In addition to making unrealistic primary assumptions, ne­
oclassicists make subsidiary assumptions declaring how economic 
life ought to be ordered. “The first assumption is that there is an 
inverse relationship between price and quantity demanded.”28 A 
second assumption defines cost as the price at which resources con­
sumed in making the product will command in their next alterna­
tive use.29 A third assumption is that resources will gravitate freely 
to their highest use if free exchange is permitted in a perfectly 
functioning market, and that when so used, resources are employed 
“ efficiently” under a condition of scarcity and rational maximiza­
tion.30 All these assumptions lead to a definition of efficiency as
27. A . Smith , T he W ealth of N ations 669-81 (N ew  Y ork  1937) (1st ed. England 
1776).
28. R . P osner, E conomic A nalysis of L aw  4-10 (2d ed. 1977).
29. Id.
30. Id.
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“exploiting economic resources in such a way that value—human 
satisfaction as measured by the aggregate consumer willingness to 
pay for goods and services— is maximized.”31 Eugene Singer notes 
that those following this line of analysis are confronted “with insu­
perable difficulties because of the incomparability . . .  of the utili­
ties of different individuals. There is no economic or objective solu­
tion for finding a ‘bliss point’ which maximizes the satisfaction of 
consumers.”32 Economists ignore the problem by burying it in an 
aggregate measure of satisfaction in their definition of “efficiency,” 
a device the law cannot use if we expect to achieve a reasonable 
and peaceful accommodation of conflicting claims in the real 
world.
Proponents of economic analysis of the law also ignore non- 
quantifiable values such as equity, fairness and justice. Instead, 
“ efficiency” is measured by static quantifiable factors—but only 
those factors deemed relevant by the model. It is a way of measur­
ing “efficiency” similar to that followed in the Vietnam War. You 
may remember that the yardsticks of efficiency in that war were 
“body counts,” tons of bombs dropped and numbers of “pacified 
villages.” It is a form of analysis equally applicable to Chicago 
school thinking as a guide to wise antitrust enforcement:
The first step is to measure whatever can be easily measured. This is 
okay as far as it goes. The second step is to disregard that which 
can’t be measured or give it an arbitrary quantitative value. This is 
artificial and misleading. The third step is to presume that what 
can’t be measured easily really isn’t very important. This is blind­
ness. The fourth step is to say that what can’t be easily measured 
really doesn’t exist. This is suicide.38
This strange concept of “efficiency” is the one that proponents 
of neoclassical economic analysis continuously invoke when criti­
cizing existing antitrust rules. What this concept means, why it 
should be the sole goal of antitrust policy and what practical con­
sequences flow from applying it to the affairs of a world not in 
conformity with the assumptions of the model, are all questions of 
considerable magnitude.34
31. Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
32. E. Singer, A ntitrust E conomics: S elected L egal C ases and E conomic A naly­
sis 23 (1968).
33. Smith, The Last Days of Cowboy Capitalism, Atlantic M onthly 43, 54 (Sept. 
1972).
34. Economists and legal scholars are in wide disagreement as to what this concept of
“efficiency”  means and what consequences would flow from its use in the real world. Nor
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If “efficiency” means that antitrust actions should only be 
brought against those with the power and inclination to restrict 
output, and if that meaning is coupled with a presumption that all 
other private activity is “efficient,”  the concept gives rise to a radi­
cal limitation on antitrust policy.35 For example, such a concept of 
“ efficiency” allows Professor Bork, now Judge Bork, to define com­
petition as “a shorthand expression, a term of art, designating any 
state of affairs in which consumer welfare cannot be increased by 
moving to an alternative state of affairs through judicial decree.”36 
Such a definition makes judicial decrees the sole focus of antitrust 
analysis and amends section 1 of the Sherman Act to read: “Every 
judicial decision not enhancing consumer welfare is hereby de­
clared to be unlawful.” This is the antitrust philosophy followed by 
the current Administration and explains why there has been a dra­
matic decline in antitrust enforcement. It is a philosophy that 
turns the law on its head and is nothing more than the expression 
of a form of simplistic libertarianism applied to antitrust policy.
What is involved in this kind of thinking is a series of covert 
tautologies. Whatever the market does is efficient and “efficiency” 
is whatever the market does. The law should not interfere in 
whatever is efficient; whatever the “market” does is efficient; the 
law should not, therefore, interfere with the market. One would 
hope that modern intellectual inquiry has grown beyond the mysti­
cism and simplistic logic of such an approach to reality.37
The application of this ideology and methodology to antitrust 
enforcement makes antitrust enforcement an anomaly in the law. 
Rather than being viewed as society’s means for bridging the gap
can econom ists agree on  why “ efficiency”  ought to  be the sole goal o f  antitrust policy . See 
Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, supra note 3.
35. See Fox, supra note 6, at 1159-62.
36. R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War With Itself 61 (1978).
37. Peter Wiles has commented on the strange assumptions and logic of this form of 
analysis as follows:
Neoclassical economics consists of a highly idiosyncratic, protective, restrictive, lock­
step methodology, that, surprisingly leaves its practitioners free to believe almost 
(but not quite) anything. The methodology studies intensively a narrow range of facts 
which it mercilessly preselects. It is an only partly scientific methodology without an 
attached ideology. The passions that used to characterize the latter in the classical 
period, however . . . now attach themselves to the former.
Thus the plodding ox of a commonplace, understated and tolerant Weltan- 
shauung has been yoked to the racehorse of an axiomatic methodology. This is a 
unique state of affairs in the world of the intellect. It makes of economics a very 
peculiar subject indeed. '
Wiles, Ideology, Methodology, and Neoclassical Economics, 2 J. Post-Keynesian Econ. 
155, 160-61 (1979).
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between our political, social and economic ideals and reality while 
regulating the exercise of undue private power in the economy, this 
reasoning process becomes a rationale for ignoring those ideals and 
for defending such power by assuming it to be the expression of 
the “efficient operation of the market.”  It makes antitrust policy 
the defender of the very things Congress believed the law would 
regulate or foster.
A further fault with this type of approach to antitrust enforce­
ment is the methodology that is employed in the application of the 
model.38 In philosophical terms, it is a combination of discredited 
forms of determinism and positivism. To one trained in philosophy 
it has the earmarks of Rudolph Carnap’s analytical positivism or 
Kelsen’s “pure theory of law” and appears oblivious to modern in­
sights about the function of perception, facts, concepts, language 
and logic in the thinking process. To avoid the obvious criticism 
that the assumptions of the model do not equate with current real­
ity, some advocates argue that it is “ scientifically” inappropriate to 
compare reality with the assumptions of the model. They claim 
that the true test of the model’s validity is made by comparing the 
implications of the model with the facts observed.39 This is indeed 
a curious notion about scientific reasoning—namely, that we must 
test a theory’s implications, but not its assumptions, against fact.40 
The theory’s assumptions, however, determine what is fact for the 
purposes of the model. Consequently, the implications always test 
out in agreement because the assumptions underlying the theory 
dictate what the theory will or will not consider to be fact or facts 
worthy of consideration. Thus the model assumes that no qualita­
tive judgments should be made about the consumer’s rational 
choices, and that the free exercise of each of those individual 
choices is the value to be pursued without regard to the morality or 
wisdom of the choices made. Legal constraints on the values being 
chosen, or legal constraints on institutions that affect the values 
being chosen, presumably are not to be condemned in the absence 
of some showing that legal intervention will enhance the abstract 
and peculiar definitions of “efficiency” and “ consumer welfare.”
This form of reasoning is totally at odds with the function and
38. Flynn, The Misuse of Economic Analysis in Antitrust Litigation, 12 Sw. U.L. 
Rev. 334 (1981).
39. See F. Friedman , The Methodology of Positive Economics, in E ssays in P ositive 
E conomics 3 (M. Friedman ed. 1953).
40. See Kornhauser, A Guide to the Perplexed Claims of Efficiency in the Law, 8 
H o fs tra  L. Rev. 591, 621-22 (1980).
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functioning of the legal system. The common law process as it has 
been developed and is applied is primarily an inductive and not a 
deductive form of reasoning. It is a paradox of its logic that one 
must know the facts to determine what law is relevant and what it 
means, while one must know the law to know what are “facts” and 
what they mean. Its process is called upon to analyze particular 
disputes in light of general principles, and to resolve those disputes 
peaceably within the judicial system according to our notions of 
procedural and substantive justice. Converting the process into one 
where the rigid application of deductive reasoning from a fixed 
model to a reality the model defines short circuits the legal pro­
cess. Values broader than those recognized by the model and facts 
that are inconsistent with the model’s assumptions are ignored or 
are judged to be irrelevant. Factors such as an imbalance in bar­
gaining power, the long and short term consequences of particular 
practices, the maldistribution of wealth and power in society, the 
existence of forces undermining the “rationality” of consumers, the 
function of time and causation in the analysis and imperfections in 
the market structure cannot be quantified and therefore are not 
factored into the equation. Inductive reasoning is thus sacrificed 
on the altar of logical positivism. Moreover, nonquantifiable values 
are rejected as potential foundations for antitrust rules because the 
model purports to ignore them. Admission of such values into the 
analysis would destroy the symmetry and frictionless functioning 
of the model as well as interject discretion into decisions dealing 
with the real world.
Reliance on social and political values in formulating what the 
law “ought” to be is rejected by the antitrust analysis of the Chi­
cago school because those values are considered irrelevant and un­
knowable. Thus, the proponents of that school of thought become 
inhabitants of a world where it is assumed that all that is worth 
knowing are those things the model claims can be quantified and 
expressed mathematically by a two-dimensional model. Hence, 
nonquantifiable values are ignored. This leaves the proponents of 
economic theorizing in antitrust free to continue using their model, 
while ignoring reality, congressional intent, moral values, the con­
tribution of other disciplines and the insights of other schools of 
economic thought. After all, they have “truth,” and it is a “truth” 
that always tests out because the model is both the condition for 
truth as well as its expression.
These observations are both practical and philosophical. They 
undermine the entire approach advocated by the Baxter-Miller
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viewpoint. Because the assumptions underlying the model do not 
comport with reality, the model does not comport with reality. Be­
cause the methodology by which the model is employed is rigidly 
deductive and the methodology of law is not and cannot be so 
rigid, the model’s use in lieu of legal reasoning does not conform to 
the functions of law. Because the model’s values do not equate 
with those values Congress and the courts have mandated for anti­
trust policy, it cannot be made the exclusive predicate of that 
policy.41
In my judgment, the Baxter-Miller approach to antitrust is 
not an approach that one should dignify by calling it “scientific,” 
describing it as “empirical” or believing it to be the epitome of 
rational and productive public policy making. Instead, it is an ide­
ology based on a theology, which any citizen obviously is free to 
believe. However, it is a theology that neither equates with reality 
nor conforms to the policy Congress has expressed in the antitrust 
laws. It is a theology that would radically change existing antitrust 
policy and the goals that many believe the antitrust laws should 
promote. It is a theology that poses the substantial risk of foreclos­
ing productive inquiry about the functioning of the economy and 
what role law ought to play in regulating the economy by freezing 
that inquiry within the confines of the detached abstractions of the 
model.
I do not wish to be understood as criticizing or belittling an­
other’s political or religious convictions. Each system of belief usu­
ally has some amount of truth to it or some insight worthy of seri­
ous consideration. I have no doubt in the integrity or honesty of 
the Administration, Assistant Attorney General Baxter or Chair­
man Miller, nor do I doubt the sincerity with which they hold their 
beliefs. Money supply, marginal tax rates and the values involved 
in neoclassical economic analysis all are relevant in some degree to 
the solution of our economic problems. Also relevant, however, are 
equitable considerations, the realities of wealth and power distri­
butions, the implications of changing institutional structures, the 
function of law as a basic tool to express our moral values, the real­
ities of consumer behavior and a host of other variables, as well as 
the insights of many other academic disciplines and schools of eco­
nomic thought. Trouble occurs and public policy is diverted down
41. For a similar criticism of Mr. Baxter’s application of economic analysis to envi­
ronmental policy in his book P eople or P enguins: T he Case for Optimal P ollution 
(1974), see Roberts & Stewart, Book Review, 88 H arv. L. R ev. 1644 (1975).
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a blind alley when a single factor is declared to be the exclusive 
one defining what reality is and what the law ought to be. Our 
current economic problems are relational and multidimensional; 
reality is complicated and untidy; the values involved are complex 
and multifaceted; and solutions cannot be simplistic and sequen­
tially applied panaceas of temporary popularity.
The Baxter-Miller theology attempts to dictate a single goal 
for antitrust policy and a single way to achieve that goal. It is in­
tolerant of conflicting or alternative solutions, because it is a theol­
ogy that has become an inflexible ideology. In turn, it is an ideol­
ogy that cannot withstand any tampering with its fixed and rigid 
assumptions. As the late Arthur Leff observed about this mode of 
thinking: “If you think you know what’s going to happen when you 
vary ‘your’ variables, you’re a booby.”42 The proponents of neoclas­
sical theorizing who now are dictating antitrust policy are not 
“boobies” who tolerate varying any of the variables of their model, 
but they are advocates of a form of tunnel vision. Like the tunnel 
vision of the monetarists and the supply-side economists, neoclas­
sical theorizing is being recognized as inadequate to deal with the 
tasks that the law confronts. In my judgment, neoclassical theo­
rizing has seen its day—however brief. I agree with an observation 
made by the legal historian Morton Horowitz:
I have the strong feeling that the economic analysis of law has 
“peaked out” as the latest fad in legal scholarship and that it will 
soon be treated by the historians of legal thought like the writings of 
Lasswell and McDougal. Future legal historians will need to exercise 
their imaginations to figure out why so many people could have 
taken most of this stuff so seriously.43
Were this not enough, most of the observers of the antitrust 
scene subscribe to the view that Congress mandated the implemen­
tation of broader social, political and economic concerns when it 
passed the antitrust laws. The vast majority of qualified historians 
and students of antitrust who have investigated the matter have 
concluded that Congress was concerned with values far beyond the 
peculiar narrow and limited values subscribed to by the propo­
nents of economic “efficiency” when it enacted the antitrust laws.44
42. Leff, Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 Va. L. Rev. 451, 476 (1974).
43. Horowitz, Law and Economics: Science, Politics, 8 H ofstba L. R ev. 905, 905 
(1980).
44. See W.B. L etwin , L aw  and E conomic P olicy: T he E volution of the  S herman 
A ntitrust A ct  105-09 (1966); H . T horelli, T he Federal A ntitrust P olicy— O rganization 
of an  A merican T radition 225-32 (1954); Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127
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Consequently, even if one were to subscribe to the neoclassicist’s 
approach to antitrust policy, and the jurisprudential assumption 
that the policy could be implemented sensibly, one still would be 
confronted with the reality that Congress has mandated otherwise. 
Congress mandated that the antitrust laws be used to implement 
political and social values as well as economic ones and that those 
laws do so by protecting competition as a process. Professor Elea­
nor Fox has succinctly captured this criticism and its implications 
as follows:
As history teaches, “efficiency” is not the reason for antitrust. 
Indeed, those who value efficiency more than competition opposed 
the antitrust bills on grounds that they would constrain some activ­
ity that might save costs for a producer and forbid some activity 
that does not interfere with optimal allocation of resources. Rather 
than standing for efficiency, the American antitrust laws stand 
against private power. Distrust of power is the one central and com­
mon ground that over time has unified support for antitrust stat­
utes. Interests of consumers have been a recurrent concern because 
consumers have been perceived as victims of the abuse of too much 
power. Interests of entrepreneurs and small business have been a 
recurrent concern because independent entrepreneurs have been 
seen as the heart and lifeblood of American free enterprise, and 
freedom of economic activity and opportunity has been thought cen­
tral to the preservation of the American free enterprise system.
One overarching idea has unified the three concerns (distrust of 
power, concern for consumers, and commitment to opportunity for 
entrepreneurs): competition as process. The competition process is 
the preferred governor of markets. If the impersonable forces of 
competition, rather than public or private power, determine market 
behavior and outcomes power is by definition disbursed, opportuni­
ties and incentives for firms without market power are increased, 
and the results are acceptable and fair. Some measure of productive 
and allocated efficiency is a byproduct, because competition tends to 
stimulate low cost production and allocate resources more respon­
sively than a visible public or private hand.45
U. P a . L. R ev. 1051,1060-65 (1979); Schwartz, "Justice”  and Other Nan-Economic Goals of 
Antitrust, 127 U. P a . L. R ev. 1076, 1076-78 (1979).
45. See Fox, supra note 6, at 1152-54. Professor Fox reaches a position similar to one 
that I have stated as follows:
The issue is a qualitative one of measuring the impact of conduct on the ideal of a 
competitive process in the context of the particular industry or trade and in light of 
the political, social and economic purposes for relying on the competitive process as 
the rule of trade. The issue is not a quantitative one of determining how much com­
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In an attempt to achieve “economic efficiency,” however, the 
Chicago school states the goal of antitrust as the preservation of 
“ competition” in a general quantitative sense. Therefore, unless a 
particular agreement or unilateral act restrains competition in the 
broad quantitative sense, there is no violation of the law. The law 
is not seen as a guarantee to each individual in the economy that 
he or she can operate a business or engage in consumer activities 
under a process of competition. Instead, the Chicago school views 
the law’s function as only the elimination of output-restricting ac­
tivity, particularly where such activity is mandated by government 
regulation. Private displacement of the competitive process in indi­
vidual cases is not a concern unless that displacement restricts out­
put generally. For example, a conspiracy to exclude an individual
petition is effected or destroyed by the practice, although power relevant market and 
quantitative effect may aid in determining the qualitative impact in some limited 
circumstances.
The basic duty imposed upon those engaged in trade or commerce is to avoid 
displacing the competitive process by collaborative action in violation of Section 1 or 
displacing the competitive process by a unilateral or conspiratorial exercise or posses­
sion of monopoly power or attempt to monopolize in violation of Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act.
A corresponding right to be protected from the risks of a displacement of the 
competitive process is vested in competitors and consumers injured in their business 
or property by an unreasonable displacement of the competitive process in violation 
of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act under Section 4 of the Clayton Act.
Flynn, Rethinking Sherman Act Section 1 Analysis: Three Proposals for Reducing the 
Chaos, 49 A ntitrust L.J. 1593,1623-27 (1982) [hereinafter referred to as Flynn, Rethinking 
Sherman Act Analysis].
In an article entitled The Function and Dysfunction of Per Se Rules in Vertical Mar­
ket Restraints, 58 Wash. U.L.Q. 767 (1980), I put the matter this way:
The general purpose of the antitrust laws is to protect and maintain the competitive 
process from unreasonable displacement by contracts, combinations, and conspiracies 
or by the unreasonable exercise of possession of monopoly power. This general pur­
pose is designed to serve social, political and economic goals. Even those who believe 
that the goals of the law are purely “ economic” cannot escape moral, political and 
social considerations in making their choice, giving it meaning, or applying the choice 
to factual controversies. The policies, however, behind choosing the competitive pro­
cess as our fundamental method for governing economic activity in the private sphere 
always have been viewed as achieving goals broader than a materialistic measure of 
economic “ efficiency.”  Those goals are limited not only to the narrowly defined and 
peculiar concepts of maximization of “efficiency” and “consumer welfare,” but also 
include, inter alia, the goals of insuring that individual entrepreneurs succeed or fail 
on the competitive merits and not by the dictates of conspiracies of others who un­
reasonably displace the competitive process, maximizing intelligent consumer choice, 
disbursing undue economic power, and subjecting private power to the discipline of 
the competitive process in place of affirmative government regulation.
Flynn, The Function and Dysfunction of Per Se Rules in Vertical Market Restraints, 58 
Wash. U.L.Q. 767,770 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Flynn, Vertical Market Restraints] (foot­
notes omitted).
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entrepreneur from the market is not actionable under this line of 
thinking unless one also can prove that competition in the entire 
market is destroyed or injured by the conduct.46
The Sherman Act,47 the Clayton Act48 and the Robinson-Pat- 
man Act,49 however, guarantee individual, as well as collective 
rights. The statutory language and legislative history of those acts 
make it apparent that Congress intended each statute to be inter­
preted as a guarantee to each individual that his or her rights in 
the economic sphere would be determined by the competitive pro­
cess. The fact that a particular restraint does not injure competi­
tion generally does not preclude the use of antitrust policy to rec­
tify a denial of the competitive process to a single individual,80 for 
the laws are designed to judge the qualitative effect of anticompe­
titive conduct as well as its quantitative effect.61 Nor does the use 
of the legal process to achieve such goals necessarily conflict with 
the efficiency of the economic system. Protection of the former 
does not necessarily deny or impede the latter.
Protection of the competitive process serves goals broader 
than the narrow neoclassical definitions of “efficiency” and “con­
sumer welfare.”52 That protection furthers innovation, individual 
economic freedom, the contribution of both consumer’s and dis­
tributor’s competitive efforts to society’s economic performance, 
the protection of economic and social freedom from undue exer­
cises of power and the dispersion of economic power in our society 
among all levels of the economy.
The Baxter-Miller approach does not explicitly protect these 
values and goals. Rather, seller decisions are seen as surrogates for 
all of them. Their approach would allow most of them to fall by 
the wayside as a result of benign neglect. The Baxter-Miller ap­
46. Most decisions have not taken this “entire market” approach but instead gener­
ally have held that conspiracies aimed at displacing the competitive process in ways that fix 
prices or exclude a competitor are per se unlawful. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County,
102 S.Ct. 2466 (1982); United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United States v. 
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
47. Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976)).
48. Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976), 29 
U.S.C. §§ 8-9 (1976)).
49. Ch. 592, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a, 13b, 21a
(1976)).
50. See Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 (1959).
51. Flynn, Rethinking Sherman Act Analysis, supra note 45.
52. The narrowness of neoclassical economic theory illustrates the underlying reason 
why many courts and antitrust commentators disagree with the Administration’s antitrust 
enforcement philosophy.
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proach would require an antitrust plaintiff to show some sort of 
injury to competition generally before denial of the competitive 
process individually could be remedied, bringing us closer to “a na­
tion of clerks,” which Justice Douglas maintained “ is anathema to 
the American antitrust dream.”53
The approach I advocate not only would permit courts to limit 
output-restricting activity that injures competition in general, but 
also would permit the courts to implement the values Congress 
sought to protect when it enacted the antitrust laws. Both the 
competitive process and competition in general would be pro­
tected, as would all of the values implicit in the antitrust laws.
III. S o m e  I m plic atio n s  for  C u r r e n t  I ssu e s  of E n fo r c e m e n t
P o licy
A. Vertical Restraints
Under the current Administration’s policy, most vertical mar­
ket restraints, restricting the freedom of traders and consumers to 
maximize their “utilities,” are seen as presumptively lawful.54 In 
presuming the legality of vertical price-fixing, vertical territorial 
restraints, vertical customer restraints and most forms of price dis­
crimination, the Baxter-Miller approach goes too far. Exclusive 
weight is given to assumptions about the rationality of sellers while 
virtually ignoring the rationality of buyers and consumers entan­
gled in a vertical restraint. Time and power are ignored in the
53. United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 543 (1973) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting).
54. Washington Post, supra note 4; see also Flynn, Vertical Market Restraints, 
supra note 45, at 772-73:
If one begins with the proposition that the goal of antitrust policy is to maximize 
“consumer welfare” as defined by the fixed models of one brand of economic theo­
rizing and the imaginary workings of a perfectly competitive market, which only per­
mit a minor premise on factual assumptions in accord with the model’s major premise 
but not necessarily in accord with unvarnished reality, the operations of deductive 
logic dictate the conclusion: Only those restraints that quantitatively displace the 
“market” and impair “ consumer welfare” are unlawful under the antitrust laws be­
cause all others are either promoting “consumer welfare” or will be efficiently reme­
died by the functioning of the perfectly competitive market. . . .  It is a conclusion, 
however, we cannot claim as true or false or right or wrong because the conclusion is 
assumed in the predicate. It is the logical fallacy of affirming the consequent. If the 
factual and legal postulates of the syllogism are either not true or not true in all 
circumstances, then the worth of the conclusion is worthless or nearly so. If the facts 
of the dispute do not comport with assumptions of fact and value of the model gov­
erning the decision of the case, then the decision is also misleading.
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analysis. Market imperfections and the countervailing social and 
political values that are inevitably involved in assessing the dispute 
and in implementing the values of the law also are ignored. The 
possibility that those imposing the restraints are acting in ways 
contrary to the assumptions of the neoclassical model, or that the 
law ought to be concerned with goals and values not allowed by the 
model, are possibilities that the theology cannot tolerate lest the 
entire edifice crumble by varying the model’s “variables.”55
Some explanation must be found, however, as to why and how 
sellers in a perfectly competitive market would impose those re­
straints. It must be an explanation that conforms with the effi­
ciency and consumer welfare goals of the neoclassical theology. 
Thus, out of the fertile imagination of the neoclassical theoreti­
cians has been born the “free rider,” a villain who denies consum­
ers any repair services, warranty work, fancy showrooms and the 
other imaginary “benefits” of non-price competition. “Free riders” 
are assumed to be a potential evil justifying every vertical re­
straint. The ill-defined concept of “ free rider” apparently is at­
tached to buyers or competitors not abiding by any goal a seller 
seeks to achieve by a vertical restraint. The neoclassical theology 
condemns “free riders” as a plague and denounces their rights and 
rationalities as beyond notice by the law. While there may be par­
ticular circumstances where it is wise or essential to sacrifice buyer 
and consumer freedom so that the public interest can be protected, 
those circumstances certainly do not justify a presumption of legal­
ity for all vertical restraints nor do they justify abandonment of 
any antitrust control of the restraint.
The neoclassical theoretician’s method of decisionmaking, 
which postulates the existence of such a mythical villain, can do 
wonders for an ideology in trouble. The hypothetical straw man 
can be used to justify the ideology’s preference for protecting pri­
vate power, existing privileges and the economic status quo while 
warding off the ultimate enemy of government intervention. Hy- 
potheticals and ruminations about imaginary “free riders” are sub­
stituted for the law’s complex, empirical and realistic analysis of 
the facts and circumstances unique to the case, in light of the mul­
tiplicity of goals that Congress mandated be implemented by the 
antitrust laws.
My view of the antitrust laws begins with a broader set of
55. Unjustifiable vertical restraints can only be explained by the assumption that 
there must be horizontal collusion lurking in the vicinity.
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goals and values that the competitive process is meant to achieve. 
Thus, I reach different results with regard to vertical price-fixing, 
vertical territorial and customer restraints and the wisdom of re­
straining by law some forms of price discrimination. With regard 
to vertical price-fixing, it is my view that vertical price-fixing ought 
to be presumptively—per se—unlawful. The Baxter-Miller ap­
proach, on the other hand, cannot reach that conclusion because it 
assumes the existence of a perfectly competitive market absent 
monopolies or cartels despite the facts of a particular case. It fur­
ther assumes that, in the absence of horizontal collusion, if vertical 
price-fixing is imposed by a rational seller, the seller’s decision 
must have been dictated by a market operating under the inexora­
ble forces of perfect competition. No other explanation is possible 
because the constraints of the model do not permit it, reality to 
the contrary notwithstanding.
Mr. Baxter believes that vertical price-fixing should not be de­
clared per se unlawful.68 He would permit, for example, manufac­
turers of technologically complex products to dictate resale prices 
despite the prohibition of such a practice by Congress implied by 
its removal of the fair trade exemption.57 Mr. Baxter would do so 
in the belief that a manufacturer of technologically complex prod­
ucts would only impose the restraint where it was necessary to pre­
vent “free riders.”58 The “free riders” imagined in this circum­
stance are distributors that would cut prices and not provide 
service for the manufacturer’s products. The fact that consumers 
or retailers exercising their rational judgment may wish to have the 
freedom to purchase from such sellers is given no importance. In­
stead, the seller’s decision would be imposed on buyers and retail­
ers on the assumption that the seller is subject to perfectly com­
petitive market pressures, and that, therefore, the seller’s 
judgment is a reliable surrogate for the public interest in these 
circumstances.
Mr. Miller apparently holds similar views. He has stated that 
vertical price-fixing—like vertical customer and territorial re­
straints—ought to be measured by a “rule of reason” rather than a 
test of per se illegality.59 Presumably, Mr. Miller is willing to ac­
56. A position being asserted by the Antitrust Division as amicus in Monsanto Corp. 
v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 684 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1982), cert, granted, 103 S.Ct. 1249 
(1983); see also Washington Post, supra note 4.
57. Washington Post, supra note 4.
58. Id.
59. Russell Stover Candies, Inc., 43 A ntitrust &  T rade R eg . R ep. (B N A ) 135, 164
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cept the practical consequences of applying a “rule of reason” to 
vertical price-fixing. Under his approach, vertical price-fixing 
would be per se lawful despite its weak economic justifications, Su­
preme Court rejection of the argument for it in the past60 and con­
gressional action mandating otherwise.61
The underlying paternalism of assuming that seller rationality 
is a sufficient surrogate for the collective rationality of all deci­
sionmakers in the marketplace does not justify giving sellers dis­
cretion to impose their view of the world on other rational maxi­
mizers. Moreover, Mr. Baxter’s use of imaginary “free riders” to 
justify a restraint on price is wholly unnecessary, even in the cir­
cumstances he postulates. Sellers simply can restrict the distribu­
tion of their products to buyers whom they are certain will provide 
point of sale services. So long as there is no conspiracy with others, 
a seller remains free to choose those with whom he will deal. In 
this way, the objective of the seller in insuring that significant 
point of sale services are provided can be achieved without unilat­
erally repudiating Supreme Court precedent, undermining the con­
gressional mandate, fostering a rebirth of resale price maintenance 
and generally undermining the goal of protecting the right of all 
entrepreneurs and consumers to contribute their competitive effort 
to the general welfare.
In the area of vertical customer and territorial restraints, the 
United States Supreme Court adopted the neoclassical position in 
Continental T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc.92 The Court’s ap­
proach in Sylvania has created considerable controversy.63 In my 
view, Sylvania adopted too broad a standard of legality for vertical 
customer and territorial restraints, just as the Schwinn64 case it 
overruled had adopted too rigid a standard of per se illegality 
prohibiting these practices. Moreover, the Sylvania Court failed to
(July 1, 1982) (Miller, Comm'r, dissenting).
60. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940).
61. See, e.g., Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, S. R ep. N o. 94-466, 94th Cong., 
1st Sess. 1, 3 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S. Code C ong. &  A d . N ews 1569 (repealing two 
acts that had allowed states to recognize manufacturers’ resale price-fixing schemes in their 
fair trade laws). The experience with fair trade inflating most resale prices and the increas­
ing evidence that non-price competition tends to generate inflation deserve no considera­
tion. See W.D. Slawsen, T he N ew  Inflation: T he C ollapse of F ree M arkets (1981).
62. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
63. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 6, at 1145 n.4; Handler, Changing Trends in Antitrust 
Doctrines: An Unprecedented Supreme Court Term—1977, 77 C olum. L. Rev. 979, 987
(1977); Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylva­
nia Decision, 45 U. C hi. L. Rev. 1 (1977).
64. United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
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establish a rational test for deciding the legality of vertical cus­
tomer and territorial restraints in particular cases. Instead, the 
Court simply suggested that an undefined “rule of reason” ap­
proach should be applied to those vertical restraints—a state of 
affairs practicing lawyers know well has resulted in making such 
practices per se lawful.65
The Sylvania Court’s approach is wholly unrealistic in its as­
sumption that perfectly competitive markets do in fact exist at all 
times and in all circumstances. In many cases, vertical restraints 
are an expression of market power, not an expression of a competi­
tive process at work. In such circumstances, the market is not one 
governed by consumer sovereignty, but instead is a market man­
aged by powerful firms operating in concentrated industries or is a 
market distorted by an imbalance of bargaining power. In such 
cases, it should not be presumed that manufacturers institute ver­
tical restrictions to increase efficiency, lower marginal costs, in­
crease profits and promote point of sale services and consumer wel­
fare. Rather, vertical restraints should be presumed to be means 
for promoting artificial product differentiation based on advertis­
ing and promotional gimmickry or the taking advantage by unfair 
means of the weaker party to the bargaining.66 Those restraints 
also should be presumed to be an exercise in market power that 
causes consumer prices to rise, thereby stimulating interbrand 
non-price competition, which insulates manufacturers from in­
trabrand and interbrand price competition and denies the compet­
itive process to the victim of the restraint.
In these circumstances, vertical customer and territorial re­
straints may well be devices for promoting the seller’s self-inter­
ested pursuit of noncompetitive profits and freedom from competi­
tion, rather than promotion of the overall public interest. 
Consequently, vertical non-price restraints, as well as vertical 
price-fixing, arguably should be presumed to be unlawful. As I 
shall explain later, this is a position I agree with, but it requires a
65. 433 U.S. at 47. The Sylvania Court’s “rule of reason”  approach has caused former 
Federal Trade Commission member Robert Pitofsky to state:
There is no existing analytical framework for applying a rule of reason generally, and 
certainly none for applying it to vertical non-price restraints. The technique of the 
Sylvania majority—quoting a long list of factors without any indication of priority or 
weight to be accorded each factor—unfortunately is standard operating procedure. 
Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78 
Colum. L. Rev. 1, 34 (1978).
6 6 . See T .  R id d e l , S . S t a m u s  & J. S h a c k e l f o r d , E c o n o m ic s : A T o o l  f o r  U n d e r ­
s t a n d in g  S o c ie t y  175-95 (1979).
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modification of the traditional views about the per se and rule of 
reason distinctions to take account of circumstances where some 
vertical restraints may be necessary to protect or promote the pub­
lic interest.
B. The Robinson-Patman Act
The Baxter-Miller approach to the Robinson-Patman Act67 as­
sumes that rational sellers will only engage in price discrimination 
for efficiency and consumer welfare objectives. This position also is 
premised on the artificial and unrealistic assumption that markets 
are perfectly competitive. If the market were perfectly competitive, 
a seller could not engage in price discrimination for anticompeti­
tive reasons because other sellers would provide goods or services 
to retailers or wholesalers discriminated against on a more attrac­
tive basis. A perfectly competitive market also would punish irra­
tional price discrimination by sellers because it would drive away 
the seller’s customers. Because the market would correct itself, 
Baxter and Miller conclude that the law should not interfere in the 
market’s natural regulatory process (in the absence of monopoly) 
with regard to price discrimination.
The supporters of the Robinson-Patman Act take an equally 
religious viewpoint about its significance. The supporters of the 
Act see it as a bastion for small business. They view it as the only 
defense for small business from the predatory and otherwise arro­
gant practices of large businesses and powerful suppliers who dic­
tate to small businesses to whom they may sell, where they may 
sell and at what price they may sell. Many in the small business 
community go so far as to say the Robinson-Patman Act is the 
only means for insuring their survival and, incidently, the “Ameri­
can way of life.” Thus, when a small retailer is competing with a 
chain store and the chain store can obtain comparable goods at a 
cheaper price and sells them at a lower price, the small retailer 
believes he is the victim of undue discrimination which will ulti­
mately destroy him.
In some cases, the small retailer is correct. In others, the lower 
price to the large retailer may be the expression of the bona fide 
working of the competitive process, rather than an indication that 
the process is being unreasonably subverted. Nevertheless, the 
small retailer believes that this kind of discrimination, with the po-
67. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976); 29 U.S.C. §§ 8-9 (1976).
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tential of destroying his business, whatever its relation to the com­
petitive process, is unfair and unjust. Clearly, that also was the be­
lief of the Congress that adopted the Act.68 The continued 
congressional support for the Act rests on the Act’s appeal to eq­
uity and fairness, even where there is an obvious sacrifice of purely 
economic benefits in particular cases. Consequently, small business 
groups and their supporters in Congress bring a religious fervor to 
the discussion of the wisdom and enforceability of the Robinson- 
Patman Act that is equaled only by the religious fervor of neoclas­
sical economic theorizers in attacking the Act.
I neither condemn nor praise the Act without reservation. To 
the Chicago school purists, I suggest that price discrimination that 
undermines the competitive process does, in fact, take place. In 
many of the industries with which I have been involved, particu­
larly in the marketing of petroleum products, widespread and un­
justified price discrimination takes place. This is particularly the 
case with regard to dual distributors.69 For example, instances of 
powerful distributors who can force locked-in independent retailers 
to pump gasoline at a loss obviously are the product of localized 
power in the distribution of gasoline products. Most retailers have 
no choice but to deal with these suppliers because there is no other 
source of supply or they are locked into the supplier by lease or 
franchise agreements. Furthermore, this practice is not likely to be 
cured because the entry of other distributors into the market is 
unlikely, given the nature of the business. Thus, dealers are locked 
into their stations in ways that make unjustified price discrimina­
tion possible, the abstractions of the model to the contrary 
notwithstanding.
I have had several reports of similar practices elsewhere in the 
country from attorneys familiar with gasoline marketing. More­
over, other forms of unjustified and anticompetitive price discrimi­
nation regularly take place in industries characterized by an imbal­
ance of bargaining strength. Those practices usually are the 
product of powerful buyers or sellers demanding or enforcing price 
differentials for the purpose of disciplining competitors, exploiting 
vulnerable retailers or excluding retailers or competitors from the
68. See Fox, supra note 6, at 1159-62.
69. Dual distributors are distributors who supply products to retailers and engage in 
retailing themselves. I know of several instances where refiners selling directly at retail 
through wholly owned outlets price their retail outlet product at or below the wholesale 
price charged independent distributors. I have investigated such instances and can find no 
cost savings justifying such a blatant form of discrimination.
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market.70
In the rarefied world of abstract economic theorizing, these 
kinds of practices simply cannot happen. They cannot happen be­
cause the model assumes that the market is perfectly competitive 
and that sellers are powerless—in the absence of a monopoly—to 
deviate from the rational demands of the market with regard to 
their pricing practices. Regional market power, the power obtained 
by successful product differentiation, an imbalance of bargaining 
power, advertising and other factors that exist in the real world 
simply are ignored. If one begins with the unreal and abstract as­
sumptions of the neoclassical model, then one must inevitably con­
clude that anticompetitive price discrimination does not exist in 
the absence of a monopoly, or that if it does exist, it is a form of 
competitive activity in response to rational market factors.
If, on the other hand, one has some experience in the real 
world, it does not take long to appreciate the fact that market im­
perfections, market power, imbalances in bargaining power, irra­
tional product differentiation and other factors, which undermine 
any possibility that reality will conform to the assumptions of the 
neoclassical model, make anticompetitive price discrimination a 
not uncommon event. Price discrimination in many instances can­
not be legitimately judged by the abstract model; instead, it must 
be judged in light of the realities of the particular industry and the 
circumstances involved in a particular case.
To those who would defend the Robinson-Patman Act without 
qualification, I would say that there is a range of price discrimina­
tion, which is a reflection of the competitive process at work. Some 
forms of legitimate price discrimination are recognized by the
70. Recently, the Fifth Circuit was confronted with a case involving price discrimina­
tion in the national com syrup market. See Dimmitt Agri Indus., Inc. v. CPC Int’l, Inc., 679 
F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1982). Dimmitt was identical to the 1916 price discrimination case of 
United States v. Com Products Refining Co., 234 F. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1916), appeal dismissed,
249 U.S. 621 (1919). In Dimmitt, CPC, the successor corporation to Corn Products, was 
again charged with using low prices in one market supported by high prices in another mar­
ket to drive out competitors. 679 F.2d at 518-19. The Fifth Circuit held that the action 
could not be maintained as an unlawful monopolization case under section 2 of the Sherman 
Act because CPC did not have a sufficient market share for a monopolization case. Id. at 
529-31. The case, however, was remanded for further trial on the question of the legality of 
the practices of CPC under an attempt-to-monopolize theory and on a price discrimination 
theory. For examples of additional price discrimination actions, see William Inglis & Sons 
Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 103 
S.Ct. 57 (1983); Borden, Inc. (Realemon), [1976-1979 Transfer Binder] T r a d e  R e g . R e p . 
(CCH) U 21,194 (1976).
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provisos to section 2 of the Robinson-Patman Act.71 Those sections 
permit a difference in price, which reflects differences in the cost of 
a manufacturer’s sale or delivery that result from the differing 
methods or quantities in which the commodities are sold to pur­
chasers. Sections 2A and 2B recognize that a difference in price 
may be justified if it is necessary to meet, in good faith, an equally 
low price of a competitor. Some of the complaints of small business 
about price discrimination are reflections of changes in marketing 
methods that benefit the public by lowering costs, but the price 
differences do not technically meet the Act’s requirements of a 
good faith response to a competitor’s low price. The original price 
discrimination law was aimed at practices outlawed on monopoliza­
tion grounds in Standard Oil v. United States,72 and United 
States v. American Tobacco Co.73 In those cases, geographic price 
discrimination was engaged in by very powerful sellers with near­
monopoly control of the market; hence, it could be attacked under 
section 2 of the Sherman Act. Section 2 of the original Clayton Act 
was adopted to prevent such predatory pricing before a seller had 
achieved full-blown monopoly power.
It is widely acknowledged that the 1936 amendments to sec­
tion 2 of the Clayton Act74 were aimed at the price and promo­
tional concessions that chain stores obtained by virtue of their 
buying power. The 1936 amendments also attempted to preserve 
the existence of independent brokers in the food and apparel in­
dustries by protecting them from the development of chain store 
buying and selling. Thus, the Robinson-Patman Act amendments 
generally are viewed by most objective observers as running con­
trary from the beginning in some ways to the basic policies of the 
Sherman Act; legitimate price competition, as well as illegitimate 
price competition, was intentionally curbed by the Congress that 
adopted the Robinson-Patman Act.
Many objective viewers also have maintained that the Act en­
courages price rigidity by requiring sellers to extend price cuts to 
all buyers if they extend them to a few. Because of Robinson-Pat­
man Act compliance difficulties, sellers in concentrated markets 
may not be willing to engage in price competition when attempting 
to take part of the market away from a competitor. New entrants
71. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 13a, 13b (1976).
72. 221 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1911).
73. 221 U.S. 106, 160-61 (1911).
74. Robinson-Patman Act, ch. 592, 49 Stat. 1528 (1936) (currently codified at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 13a, 13b (1976)).
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into a market who attempt to overcome existing trade relation­
ships by way of price concessions also may find that their entry is 
made more difficult and risky by the Act. The prospective entrant 
may be unable to cut prices to a particular buyer in order to enter 
the market because of risks that the conduct may violate the 
Robinson-Patman Act.75 While some of these observations obvi­
ously are opinions and speculative, they do identify risks, which 
should concern us. Empirical investigation should be undertaken 
to determine whether these risks are real or imaginary, and 
whether the more appropriate response would be a program of de- 
concentrating, where possible, those affected industries.
These observations also imply that the basic goals of the 
Robinson-Patman Act may require the sacrifice of the competitive 
process to achieve equality of opportunity and fairness. Clearly, 
equalizing-opportunity and fairness were the congressional pur­
poses behind the 1936 amendments to the original Act. Those cur­
rently charged with enforcing the statute are bound to carry out 
those purposes. It must be recognized, however, that in some cases, 
pursuit of the equitable goals of the Robinson-Patman Act may 
collide with the competitive concerns of the Sherman Act, and de­
ciding which concern should be promoted in a particular case is 
not an obvious or easy task.
Proponents and opponents of the Robinson-Patman Act also 
must face another reality: The Robinson-Patman Act, as a practi­
cal matter, is inapplicable to a great many cases because the courts 
have severely restricted the applicability of the Act in a number of 
ways. For example, the courts have interpreted the commerce pro­
vision of the Act as requiring one or more of the discriminatory 
sales to be across state lines.76 Price discrimination that takes 
place wholly within the borders of a single state is, therefore, be­
yond the reach of the statute. The statute also applies only to
75: The Act also may generate other risks to competition. A study found that:
The Robinson-Patman Act has impaired competition and the development of new 
methods of distribution in numerous other respects: by discouraging sellers from 
passing on cost savings to buyers, it has impaired experimentation with possibly more 
efficient methods of distribution integrating wholesale and retail functions; by requir­
ing proportionally equal treatment in certain promotional practices, it has discour­
aged experimentation with price-cutting methods which are equivalent to desirable 
types of price differentials; by prohibiting sellers from paying brokerage to customers 
or their agents, it has erected an artificial protective barrier around independent bro­
kers and inhibited integration of brokerage functions.
President Johnson’s Task Force Report on Antitrust Policy, [415 Supp.] T r a d e  R e g . R e p .
(CCH) (1969).
76. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200-01 (1974).
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goods or commodities,77 not to services. Furthermore, in J. Truett 
Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp.,79 the Supreme Court held 
that the proof of damage requirement in private suits under the 
statute means that a plaintiff must make some showing of actual 
injury directly and clearly attributable to the price difference.79 
Prior decisions had allowed a plaintiff to rely on the amount of the 
price difference as the measure of damage.80 The Truett Payne 
Court overruled this method of proving damages and imposed a 
standard of proof that probably is impossible to meet in many 
cases because the plaintiff will have to show the amount of injury 
directly attributable to the price difference, rather than simply as­
suming that the price difference equals the damage suffered.
Section 2(f) of the Act, prohibiting a buyer from inducing a 
discrimination in price, also has been limited by a recent decision. 
In Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC.,81 the Court held that 
the defense of “meeting competition” was available in a section 
2(f) action. In that case, a powerful buyer had induced the seller, 
Borden Milk Company, to give the buyer a lower price in order to 
meet competition from another seller of dairy products. The Court 
held that because the “meeting competition” defense was available 
to the seller, who had been induced to give the discriminatory 
price to the buyer, the same defense was therefore available to the 
buyer.82 While I do not quarrel with the Court’s analysis or result 
in Great Atlantic, it is a serious limitation on the effectiveness of 
section 2(f) in restricting powerful buyers from using fair or foul 
means to induce favorable price discrimination.
These practical limitations on the applicability of the Robin­
son-Patman Act make it very difficult to maintain a successful 
price discrimination case beyond the motion stage, let alone have it 
presented to a jury. In the case of private litigation, the feasibility 
of bringing a case is further limited by the cost of modern antitrust 
litigation. A small businessman victimized by illegal price discrimi­
nation must not only overcome the technical legal hurdles of the 
Act’s commerce requirement, for example, but also must have a
77. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a, 13b, 21a (1976).
78. 451 U.S. 557 (1981).
79. Id. at 562.
80. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969); 
Bigelow v. RKO Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946); Eastman Kodak v. Southern Photo 
Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
81. 440 U.S. 69 (1979).
82. Id. at 81.
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substantial amount of money in order to finance this highly com­
plex litigation. No sensible attorney would consider taking any but 
the most blatant and clear-cut case unless many thousand dollars 
were paid in advance to finance the litigation.
Many of the same practical problems face the enforcement 
agencies. It is not surprising that the significant decline in Robin- 
son-Patman Act private litigation in the last decade has been par­
alleled by a similar decline in the number of public enforcement 
actions by the federal agencies. The Act continues to have some 
vitality, however, because many businesses that wish to abide by 
the law or are fearful of expensive and time-consuming litigation, 
make substantial internal efforts to comply with the Act in their 
general marketing practices. Given the current Administration’s 
obvious unwillingness to enforce the statute, however, it seems 
likely that many firms will simply abandon their compliance ef­
forts. Consequently, I expect to see substantial price discrimina­
tion to begin taking place because the statute has been reduced to 
a paper tiger that no one need fear.
Whatever one might think about the merits and practicalities 
of the Robinson-Patman Act, however, it is clear that in passing 
the statute, Congress intended to protect small business from the 
power and influence of large businesses. Congress made the choice 
despite risks to the competitive process. Thus, the current lack of 
enforcement by the Justice Department and the FTC conflicts 
with the expressed congressional intent that the Act be enforced 
and that it be enforced in a manner that promotes equity and 
equality of opportunity in the marketplace. If enforcement officials 
do not like the statute and believe it should be substantially al­
tered or amended, their responsibility is to ask Congress to adopt 
their views. The rejection by enforcement officials of their respon­
sibility to enforce the statute clearly is a usurpation of legislative 
functions. It is not their function to practice benign neglect and 
thereby unilaterally repeal statutes that Congress has adopted. If it 
is a matter of conscience with them, they should seriously consider 
resigning their office because they no longer are following their 
oaths of office.
IV. R ecom m en d ation s f o r  E n fo r c e m e n t  o f  t h e  A n t i t r u s t
L a w s
An unwise enforcement policy may do just as much damage as 
an outright refusal to follow the clear mandates of Congress and 
the courts. Some of our current economic difficulties probably are
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attributable to the failure to enforce wisely and adequately the an­
titrust laws during the past two or three decades. Consequently, it 
is not enough to criticize the philosophical underpinnings of the 
Baxter-Miller approach to antitrust enforcement, nor is it enough 
simply to take ideological issue with that approach and point out 
its obvious shortcomings with regard to the public interest. It is 
also insufficient to reveal the arrogance of enforcement officials 
who either assume that they have the unilateral authority to repeal 
statutes adopted by Congress or that they can refuse to enforce the 
policies that the courts and Congress have declared to be goals of 
the antitrust laws. Serious as these questions are, there are sub­
stantial difficulties and policy questions with regard to how the an­
titrust laws should be enforced in late twentieth century America.
If one surveys the wreckage of our economic landscape, it is 
apparent that many of the major industries that are in difficulty 
have been characterized by substantial economic concentration 
during the post-World War II period. For the past twenty years, 
committees of Congress, most notably the House and Senate Anti­
trust Subcommittees, have engaged in extensive surveys of eco­
nomic concentration in such industries as automobile manufactur­
ing and steel. Those hearings before the antitrust subcommittees 
indicated that the levels of economic concentration in the auto and 
steel industries, for example, were much above the levels necessary 
for economies of scale. Warnings were put forth that the absence of 
competition in those industries was dangerous and ultimately 
could lead to adverse consequences for the public interest.
We currently are paying for our past failure to heed those 
warnings and maintain a competitive market structure in our basic 
automobile and steel industries. American companies have been al­
lowed to become inefficient, inflexible and sloppy; they were con­
tent with the status quo and incapable of rapidly responding to 
changing circumstances and a new economic environment.83 Large 
shares of the American market were seized by smaller and more 
competitive foreign producers, particularly producers in Japan, be­
cause American companies were not responsive to consumer de­
mand. Instead, American companies operating in noncompetitive 
industries were accustomed to manipulating and controlling that 
demand while producing inferior products. While one may argue 
that the forces of competition ultimately prevailed in these in­
83. See Battered by Imports, Car Makers Get Serious About Raising Quality, Wall 
St. J., Aug. 26, 1982, at 1, col. 6.
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stances, the severe economic damage done to our economy and to 
those regions of the country now suffering the consequences was a 
disproportionate and unnecessary price to pay. The intervention of 
the legal system some ten to twenty years ago may well have 
helped to avoid or at least have minimized the economic and 
human costs we now are paying.
I believe one could also make a strong case for the proposition 
that the changes in the law that have been occurring at the urging 
of the neoclassical ideologists are contributing to inflation and 
bringing about the demise of small businesses in record numbers. 
While not the exclusive cause of either of these problems, the cur­
rent policy of allowing vertical restraints, including vertical price 
restraints, will shift even more the emphasis in the marketplace 
from one of competition on price to one of competition on non­
price factors. Although not all non-price competition is evil, much 
of it contributes to higher consumer costs and to attempts to ma­
nipulate consumer demand by advertising, artificial product differ­
entiation and other gimmicks. Price competition, on the other 
hand, can sort out worthwhile non-price competition from that 
which is not worthwhile.
Adverse social effects of current enforcement policy also may 
be taking place. Small business finds itself defenseless against the 
undue exercise of power in the economy. The innovation and com­
petitive contributions of small business, often considered to be the 
primary source of innovation and competition in the economy, are 
subjected to the dictates of powerful buyers and sellers. Those 
powerful buyers and sellers often tell small business where they 
may sell, to whom they may sell, at what price they may sell and 
sometimes whether they may remain in business at all. Where not 
clearly justified, the exercise of such power interfering with indi­
vidual economic freedom is just as objectionable as the unjustified 
exercise of government power interfering with individual political 
freedom. The refusal to interject antitrust policy into the situation 
means that the small businesses have no counterweight to the ex­
ercise of undue power by the economically powerful. Thus, we sac­
rifice the competitive contribution of the small on the altar of an 
unjustified presumption in favor of bigness. This is an unrealistic 
blindness to power in the economy.
In response to this current state of affairs I offer several rec­
ommendations. Some of these proposed changes are legislative, 
while others require a change in the basic emphasis of enforcement 
policy.
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First, it should be made clear that the basic purpose of the 
antitrust laws is to guarantee that everyone engaged in economic 
activity in this society is entitled, to the maximum extent possible, 
to have their success or failure governed by a competitive process. 
Efficiency, particularly the strange concept associated with neo­
classical economics, is not the sole goal of the antitrust laws. 
Rather, the American antitrust laws were passed and have been 
enforced as a means for controlling and dispersing private power.
The antitrust laws could be considered an economic bill of 
rights in the private sphere. They act as a check on any arbitrary 
and qualitatively anticompetitive exercise of power that attempts 
to displace the competitive process. Professor Fox has succinctly 
noted: “There are four major historical goals of antitrust, and all 
should continue to be respected. These are: (1) dispersion of eco­
nomic power, (2) freedom and opportunity to compete on the mer­
its, (3) satisfaction of consumers, and (4) protection of the compe­
tition process as market governor.”84
This philosophy comports with the basic philosophy mandated 
by Congress and the courts—one that the committees of Congress 
should insist that enforcement officials follow. Adoption of this 
philosophy would require a shift in the present philosophy of the 
enforcement agencies, a shift I do not expect to occur so long as 
Mr. Baxter and Mr. Miller are in charge. If the enforcement agen­
cies continue to follow their present policies, we will see the accel­
erating demise of small and medium-sized businesses. With that 
demise, their contributions of innovation, price competition, effi­
ciency, independence and flexibility also will perish.
This is not a policy requiring atomization of large firms or one 
that assumes “big is bad.” I do not favor destruction of economies 
of scale where they are clearly required, nor do I assume that big is 
evil or necessarily inefficient. On the other hand, it must be recog­
nized that large-sized firms often possess power and often are char­
acterized by large and unwieldy bureaucracies. Antitrust is a neces­
sary constraint on power in the private sphere. Thus, the antitrust 
laws need an activist enforcement policy that aims primarily at the 
exercise of unnecessary power in the private sphere and not merely
84. Fox, supra note 6, at 1182:
A fifth possible goal of antitrust is the preservation of small size for its own sake. 
Because of the unusual potential for conflict between this objective and consumers’ 
interests, I do not propose incorporation of this goal into antitrust policy. A sixth 
possible goal, justice, is vague in conception and is, in fact, a by-product of several 
more specific goals. I therefore do not treat this value separately.
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at output-restricting practices.
The policy I propose is essential for our economic well-being. 
It carries with it the promise that the competitive process will sort 
out and reward optimum scale, efficient structure, worthwhile in­
novation and the proper measure of economic freedom, punish­
ment and reward in the private sphere.
Second, the courts should view the basic purpose of section 1 
of the Sherman Act as the protection of the competitive process in 
a qualitative sense, and the per se and rule of reason analyses 
should be viewed as a single form of analysis for establishing evi­
dentiary presumptions of whether the law has been violated or not 
by an unreasonable displacement of the process in particular cases. 
By using the per se and rule of reason analyses as a means to de­
tect a statutory violation rather than as rubrics to be employed as 
the major premise of a syllogism in deductive logic to then dictate 
what facts will be required or allowed to make up the minor pre­
mise, courts would reinstate the function of legal analysis as the 
bridge between theory and the tumultuous world of reality.86
The current approach of the courts is to treat the per se and 
rule of reason concepts as establishing separate categories of hard 
line rules. Thus, the function of the courts becomes one of pige­
onholing specific conduct within or outside a specific per se rule or 
of resolving the dispute under an undefined rule of reason analysis 
with its own set of meandering rules and factors to be weighed. 
This process has made antitrust litigation highly artificial, legalis­
tic and expensive. It has come to resemble tax court litigation, 
where great effort is expended on exploring arcane conceptual mi­
nutiae and law becomes a religious dogma divorced from its moral
85. Flynn, Rethinking Sherman Act Analysis, supra note 45, at 1594-1600:
We should think of both [per se and rule of reason analyses] as a single method of 
analysis for establishing or not establishing evidentiary presumptions allocating bur­
dens of proof rather than a series of substantive rules with square corners capable of 
neatly dictating legal results whatever the facts, whatever the industry and whatever 
the circumstances. To borrow a cliche from first year law school classes, per se and 
rule of reason analysis are tools—not rules. They are methods of analysis for deter­
mining whether the statute has been violated, not rubrics to be employed as the ma­
jor premise of the syllogism in deductive logic to then dictate what facts will be re­
quired or allowed to make up the minor premise . . . .  [S]ome of the presumptions 
would be conclusive in most cases while in others the presumption would merely shift 
the burden of proof of justification, defense, or excuse to the defendant once a partic­
ular category of conduct is shown. In still other cases there would be no presumption 
shifting the burden of proof, but an affirmative burden on the plaintiff to go forward 
with the evidence proving a contract, combination, or conspiracy unreasonably re­
strains trade.
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ends and the reality it is dealing with. As a result, antitrust litiga­
tion has become a highly expensive, complex and protracted pro­
cess—a process that is far beyond what is required fairly to adjudi­
cate and acceptably establish the facts and resolve the competing 
values involved in a particular case.
In part, this state of affairs is attributable to the needlessly 
complicated and excessive arguments over irrelevant and abstract 
economic concepts. While economic analysis is relevant to an un­
derstanding of the industry involved, and sometimes to the practi­
cal consequences of judicial intervention in a particular case, its 
importance has been exaggerated greatly in many cases. For exam­
ple, the function of power in tying analysis should be limited to 
identifying the existence of a tie in cases where the transaction 
might be a voluntary one of mutual convenience or an exclusive 
dealing arrangement.86 In a recent case applying an “ injury to com­
petition” philosophy, one court required proof that coercive tying 
injured “competition in a relevant market” before it would find a 
violation of the antitrust laws.87 That type of inquiry is expensive, 
time-consuming and irrelevant because the essence of unlawful ty­
ing is the exercise of power that displaces the competitive pro­
cess—not the destruction of competition generally in a relevant 
market.
A similar misunderstanding of the primary goals of antitrust 
policy has provoked a split in the circuits on cases involving verti­
cal conspiracies to terminate price cutting distributors. These cases 
usually occur where retailers complain to a supplier about the 
price-cutting or other competitive tactics of another retailer. When 
the supplier joins with the complaining retailers and cuts off the 
price cutter, does the victim have an antitrust claim in the absence 
of proof of an injury to competition generally? The Third and Sev­
enth Circuits have upheld an antitrust claim in that type of situa­
tion, implicitly recognizing the purpose of the law as protection of 
the competitive process.88 The Second Circuit, however, has re­
jected a similar claim, implicitly holding that the purpose of the
86. See Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2, 686 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 
1982), cert, granted, 103 S.Ct. 1271 (1983); Bauer, A Simplified Approach to Tying Ar­
rangements: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 33 V a n d . L. R e v . 283 (1980).
87. In re Data General Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 529 F. Supp. 801, 809 (N.D. CaL 
1981).
88. Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164, 167-68 (3rd Cir. 1979); 
Spray-Rite Service Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1982), cert, granted, 103 
S.Ct. 1249 (1983).
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law is protection of competition generally, despite the effect on the 
competitive process as it applies to a single firm.89 I agree with the 
Third and Seventh Circuits’ approach because it gives effect to the 
basic purposes of the law. However, under the analysis established 
by the Second Circuit, before the victim of such a restraint may 
recover, proof of injury to competition generally—an elaborate and 
expensive type of economic proof—must be advanced, even though 
there usually is no identifiable harm to shortrun “economic effi­
ciency,” nor any enhancement of it by the restraint. That process 
of analysis results in a court’s failure to implement the goals of the 
statute in light of the specific facts of individual cases and a failure 
to curb longrun harm to economic goals of antitrust policy.
Adoption of the reform that I advocate would enable antitrust 
analysis to accommodate itself to serving all the goals of the law 
while still accounting for the complexities of modern marketing 
practices, modern litigation, and modern economic institutions. 
For example, in vertical territorial and customer restraint cases, 
the conduct should be viewed as presumptively unlawful because it 
is often the product of undue power by a seller or a buyer that 
unnecessarily restricts the competitive effort of retailers. The con­
duct has the effect of reducing intrabrand and interbrand price 
competition and it frequently is an unnecessary infringement on 
the competitive freedom of the victim of the restraint. The Sylva- 
nia opinion leaves the law in a mass of confusion; there is no 
known standard for determining whether a particular use of verti­
cal customer or territorial restraints is an “unreasonable” restraint 
of trade. For all practical purposes, such conduct is per se lawful. 
Under my proposal, the conduct would be presumed unlawful sub­
ject to a defense that the restraint is necessary to protect consum­
ers {e.g., control the marketing of a dangerous product), that it is 
necessary to achieve some legitimate business objective that can be 
weighed and evaluated objectively {e.g., provide essential point of 
sale services) and that it is no more restrictive of intrabrand and 
interbrand competition than is absolutely necessary.
Third, in accord with my proposed change of approach that 
would establish evidentiary presumptions in place of the concep­
tion of per se and rule of reason as a catalogue of rigid pigeonholes, 
I would classify vertical price-fixing, vertical customer restraints 
and vertical territorial restraints as presumptively unlawful. In the
89. Oreck v. Whirlpool Corp., 639 F.2d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 
1083 (1982).
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case of vertical price-fixing the presumption would be a particu­
larly strong one with very few, if any, exceptions to the rule.
Using vertical price-fixing to restrain the imaginary “free rid­
ers” with whom Mr. Baxter apparently is concerned, simply is too 
great a restraint on the competitive process, intrabrand price com­
petition and the freedom of traders and consumers to be tolerated. 
There may be some unusual cases where such an argument might 
be made that efficiency requires the restraint, but I am aware of 
none that has been advanced or empirically justified. If such a case 
should arise in the future, treatment of the per se rule as an evi­
dentiary presumption should permit a court in a specific case to 
take account of any legitimate and factually verified justification 
for the restraint. The Baxter-Miller approach simply would enable 
the widespread use of vertical price-fixing because those subject to 
the law would have no fear of enforcement action brought by the 
government or victims of the restraint. Even if an action were 
brought, it would be subject to an extensive and expensive trial 
under the current rule of reason approach. That result is unaccept­
able and would only further encourage the interference with the 
independence of traders and the growing rigidity in pricing struc­
tures, as well as result in higher prices to consumers in the long 
run.
In the case of vertical customer and territorial restraints, a 
somewhat broader range of justifications or defenses may be per­
mitted if, for example, customer restraints are necessary because of 
the dangerous nature of a product or if territorial restraints are 
needed to induce a dealer to make the large capital investment 
necessary for the marketing of certain products. Such restraints, 
however, should be no more restrictive than objectively necessary 
under the facts of a specific case, a factor seldom weighed in the 
mass of confusion that now prevails in litigating a case under the 
ephemeral “rule of reason” standard mandated by Sylvania.
Fourth, with regard to the Robinson-Patman Act, I have sev­
eral proposals. Initially, the Act should be enforced by the agencies 
charged with the responsibility of enforcing it. Those agencies have 
enforcement discretion and can avoid bringing actions that collide 
too directly with the Sherman Act philosophy of maintaining a 
competitive process. So far as I know, Congress still bears the basic 
law-making function and the function of choosing among such an­
titrust goals as “equity” and “efficiency.” We have not delegated 
that authority to self-appointed and unelected experts who follow 
their own ideological preferences. In many price discrimination
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cases there is an anticompetitive effect. Enforcement of the Act 
does not conflict with the Sherman Act’s policy of controlling un­
due power in the economy. The outright refusal to prosecute any 
cases at all under the Robinson-Patman Act is just as harmful a 
policy as would be the prosecuting of all potential cases without 
regard to harmonizing conflict where possible.
Legislative reform of the Act is necessary, however. I suggest 
that the Sherman Act be amended in exchange for repeal of the 
Robinson-Patman Act. Section 2 of the Sherman Act should define 
“attempt to monopolize” more explicitly to deal with the unilateral 
exercise of power: “For the purposes of this Act, an attempt to 
monopolize shall include any unilateral conduct, done with the 
purpose and effect, unreasonably, of fixing prices or excluding a 
competitor.” The proposed amendment not only would require 
proof of purpose and effect, but also would require that the con­
duct be unreasonable under the circumstances. It would provide a 
tool for sorting out procompetitive price discrimination from an­
ticompetitive price discrimination. Such an amendment would en­
able courts to develop standards for regulating that type of price 
discrimination which is an unjustifiable exercise of economic 
power; price discrimination injuring the competitive process and 
the rights of individual entrepreneurs to succeed or fail by virtue 
of the competitive process.
At the same time, price discrimination consistent with the op­
eration of the competitive process would not be illegal. At present, 
there is a gap in the Sherman Act. The statute does not provide 
legal recourse against a firm with only local or regional power un­
less that power is overwhelming and is therefore substantial 
enough to become unlawful monopolization in the structural sense 
of an overwhelming market share. Cases such as United States v. 
Empire Gas Corp.90 no longer would escape legal control. In that 
case, a propane gas distributor in Missouri was engaged in a pro­
gram of geographical price discrimination. The defendant raised 
prices in one town to support price cutting in another town, 
thereby driving out small distributors of liquid petroleum gas. The 
court held that the action could not be maintained as an attempt 
to monopolize because the defendant did not have a substantial 
enough market share to equal monopoly power.91 The case could 
not have been brought under the Robinson-Patman Act because
90. 537 F.2d 296 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977).
91. Id. at 307.
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there were not two or more sales across state lines.
The amendment I propose would allow actions, similar to that 
attempted in Empire Gas, to be brought attacking unjust price 
discrimination, which undermines the competitive process or con­
stitutes an undue exercise of economic power in a manner contrary 
to the historic purpose of the antitrust laws. The amended statute 
would be far less complicated than the Robinson-Patman Act. It 
also would avoid the difficulties arising from the “in commerce” 
standard of the Robinson-Patman Act, and prevent the practical 
difficulties generated by the standard of proof necessary to show 
damage in a case under the Act. Under my proposed amendment,
services also would be covered. The amendment would allow courts
t
to fashion, on a common law basis, a series of standards by which 
we could isolate necessary and beneficial forms of price discrimina­
tion from those that are unnecessary and harmful.
In addition, the amendment would close a gap in section 2 of 
the Sherman Act. As section 2 is now interpreted, unilateral exer­
cises of economic power that are destructive to the competitive 
process by those without “monopoly power” or close to it cannot 
be remedied. If the amendment is not adopted however, I would 
leave the Robinson-Patman Act in force for the prophylactic value 
it still may carry, and the possibility that future enforcement offi­
cials may more responsibly deal with it than do those presently 
charged with its enforcement.
Fifth, both Houses of Congress should hold extensive hearings 
on the overall policies of the antitrust laws. Many others in the 
field, on both sides of the debate, should be invited to give their 
views to Congress. The issues involved here are fundamental, and 
their resolution has such far-reaching consequences that Congress 
must devote substantial time considering them. I suggest that the 
objective of such a hearing be the drafting of a “Statement of Pur­
pose” for the Sherman Act to serve as a guide to its interpretation 
and implementation. The old Interstate Commerce Act92 had such 
a statement of purpose, called the “National Transportation Pol­
icy,”93 which heavily influenced the interpretation and application 
of that statute. Interpretation and application of the antitrust laws 
could be substantially benefited by a similar declaration of con­
gressional purpose. That statement should inform litigants, courts
92. Ch. 498, 49 Stat. 543 (1935) (currently codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-327 (1976)).
93. See National Transportation Policy Act, ch. 722, 54 Stat. 899 (1940) (amended 
and currently codified at 49 U.S.C. § 10101 (Supp. 1981)).
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and commentators of what Congress expects these laws to achieve. 
I would urge that the statement of purpose framed by Professor 
Fox94 be the one Congress adopts. The congressional purpose 
would thereby be clear. Enforcement officials could no longer re­
nounce their responsibility to fulfill that purpose by appeal to an 
ideology and methodology inconsistent with the law’s goals and re­
ality or by referring to transparent rewrites of history that distort 
the purpose of the law.
V. C o n c lu s io n
Antitrust policy is at an ideological crossroads. The debate to­
day is not between irrational proponents of the atomization of the 
American economy (usually mislabeled “populists”) and the propo­
nents of reason and the public good (usually self-described as 
“economists”). Rather, the debate is whether one line of reasoning 
and one abstract source of wisdom among the many and conflicting 
schools of economic thought should be the sole guide of antitrust 
policy, or whether antitrust policy should foster a multiplicity of 
goals aimed at controlling private power in the economy and draw 
from a multiplicity of sources of wisdom so long as identifiable 
longrun economies of scale are not lost.
The proponents of an exclusively “economic” approach (the 
“ Chicago school”) have had three advantages in the debate. One 
advantage is the underlying appeal to individual freedom em­
braced in their economic model. The fact that it is unthinkingly 
applied to giant institutions, and that it falls to pieces when ap­
plied to the real affairs of a complex and highly interrelated society 
where one person’s freedom is often another’s deprivation, seems 
not to concern proponents of the model. It does, however, empha­
size an important value of individual freedom, which should not be 
ignored. The Chicago school’s second advantage is that it appears 
to produce certainty—square rules to decide every question—even 
though the certainty provided is a false certainty and the rules it 
generates exclude consideration of facts and values relevant to the 
problems antitrust regulation must address. Political economy con­
fronts the complexities of the real world, and those complexities 
are not willing or apt to conform to the predictions of artificial 
rules or the political preferences of the theoretician. Furthermore, 
the use of a mechanical analytical system in law short circuits the
94. Fox, supra note 6, at 1190-91.
HeinOnline -- 1983 Utah L. Rev. 310 1983
No. 2] ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 311
law’s function of promoting commonly held moral beliefs and a 
sense of justice in the peaceful and pragmatic resolution of dis­
putes. The Chicago school’s third advantage is that it has captured 
the thinking and imagination of brilliant and persuasive advo­
cates—the Baxters, Borks and Posners of this world. They are 
honest, brilliant, and persuasive in their advocacy. They enjoy 
widespread admiration and respect in the academic community, an 
admiration and respect I share as well. Some of my best friends are 
believers, but nevertheless the theology is misused in the prag­
matic world of the legal process. It is impracticable, and it is mis­
leading when applied to the affairs of the real world and the 
problems that individuals must confront each day. The certainty 
with which the beliefs are honestly held also is the source of a dan­
gerous arrogance. It is an arrogance that justifies summary dismis­
sal of competing viewpoints, the refusal to consider countervailing 
viewpoints and the assumption of powers that our political process 
has committed elsewhere. Lastly, its simplistic methodology under­
mines the complex analytical process that the law must use if the 
law is to cope constructively with resolving the reality of specific 
disputes in accord with the long term values Congress has man­
dated be implemented by antitrust policy. It is essential that the 
function of the legal process as the bridge between brute reality 
and principle for the effective and peaceful resolution of disputes 
in society in conformity with the values of society not be over­
whelmed by the superficial appeal of a coherent but unrealistic 
model of a world that does not exist.
The philosophy and reforms I propose do not reject a role for 
economic analysis—I hope a more empirical, realistic and all-inclu­
sive form of it—in the development of antitrust policy and its ap­
plication to specific cases. That role, however, is a subservient 
one—not a role of displacing the legal process. Nor do the reforms 
I propose necessarily breed an ambiguity and uncertainty in the 
standards that would be developed. Instead, those reforms would 
create a deeper understanding of the principles and values on 
which antitrust policy rests and a means for explicitly reconciling 
conflict between those principles and values. They would provide a 
practical means by which those basic policies may be linked to the 
litigation of specific disputes. They also would make possible the 
constructive use of new insights from economics and other disci­
plines too often ignored, which have something to contribute to the 
understanding of the evolution of our society. Lastly, these reforms 
would fulfill the functions of the legal process, which too often
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have been subverted by a simplistic and mechanical reliance on the 
arcane.
I believe that we are witnessing the effects of a distorted anti­
trust doctrine, a doctrine redefined to serve the narrow ends and 
values of a political ideology inconsistent with the purposes Con­
gress has mandated for antitrust policy and the affairs of the real 
world. If the choice is to be made to change the goals of antitrust 
policy and the means by which they are implemented, our consti­
tutional and political systems vest the authority to do so in the 
hands of Congress, not in the transitory and unaccountable hands 
of political appointees of the executive branch. It is time for Con­
gress to insist that its prerogative be followed and for the courts to 
recognize that the resolution of antitrust disputes cannot take 
place in the vacuum of an abstract model detached from reality, 
intolerant to wisdom from elsewhere, inconsistent with legal rea­
soning and at odds with unvarnished reality.
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